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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to seek linkage between stock overreaction behaviour and 
financial bubbles in the Malaysian stock market. Monthly data over a period between 
January 1987 and December 2006 shows no clear evidence of stock overreaction behaviour 
in the market. However, when the study split the analysis into two sub-periods, evidence of 
stock overreaction behaviour becomes significant in the pre-crisis sub-period, but there is 
no significant evidence of financial bubbles in the same sub-period. During the post crisis, 
evidence of stock overreaction seems to diminish, and evidence of financial bubbles 
however, is observed in the period. This study believes that evidence of bubbles observed 
in the Malaysian stock market in the post crisis period is due to stock overreaction that took 
place in the market prior to the crisis. 
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1.  Introduction 
Overreaction phenomenon was first discovered by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Stock overreaction 
behaviour can be defined as a tendency for stock returns to experience reversal, thus consistent with the 
mean reversion behaviour. According to Chen and Sauer (1997), the underlying reasoning and trading 
implications derived from the mean reversion and stock overreaction are identical although the former 
focuses on the market portfolio while the latter concentrates on the winner-loser effect. Both 
phenomena imply that information based on prior performance can be used to predict future 
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performance. Stock prices may be temporarily swing away from their fundamental values but would 
revert back to their means over the long run. 
A financial bubble on the other hand is defined as deviations in the stocks’ price from the 
fundamental value. Stock price bubbles are produce as a result of long run up in prices. During the 
period of bubbles, the probability that the price will revert is very low. Theoretically, the longer the 
duration of price increases, the lower the probability that price will drop in the subsequent period, thus 
inconsistent with the mean reversion process. It seems that during the period of stock overreaction, 
there is very unlikely that stock price bubbles will build up. This is because for price bubbles to 
sustain, stock prices should overshoot their fundamentals value over a long period of time and the mis-
valuation should be explosive. If prices revert in the following period, then it is not consistent with the 
bubbles theory. 
Potential linkage between stock overreaction behaviour and financial bubbles have been raised 
by earlier studies such as Komáromi (2003), Dreman and Lufkin (2000), Bremer, Hiraki and Sweeney 
(1997) and Ohanian (1996). They conjecture that stock overreaction can be a major cause of financial 
bubbles. The objective of this paper is to investigate potential linkage between stock overreaction and 
bubbles. This paper is divided into 5 sections. Section 2 and 3 will proceed with methodology on stock 
overreaction and financial bubbles respectively. Section 4 continues with discussion on the findings 
while section 5 summarizes the paper. 
 
 
2.  Methodology: Stock Overreaction 
The availability of data over a period of 20 years starting on January 1987 and ending on December 
2006 provides 9 non-overlapping 24-month (two-year) portfolio formation (rank) periods, namely 
1987-1988, 1989-1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, and 
2003-2004, and the corresponding test periods, which are 1989-1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-
1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004 and 2005-2006. At the end of each rank period, 
all companies with a complete set of return for a particular rank period are identified. The number of 
qualified firms in the sample is expected to gradually increase due to increase of new listing during the 
sampling period. 
The study follows the basic framework of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) to test for stock 
overreaction behaviour. The study calculates returns for stock listed on Bursa Malaysia by using the 
following formula: 
 
Where, represents return on security i at period t, and  represent price on security i 
at period t and period t -1. The return metric used here is the natural logarithmic of the stock monthly 
closing price obtained from Datastream. The same calculation is carried out for return on market with 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index (KLSE CI) being used as a proxy for the market. 
This study then computes monthly market adjusted abnormal return (AR) for stock i as: 
 
Where  and  are returns for stock i and market m, respectively. At the end of the 
formation period, for example on 31 December 1988, cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) for every 
stock over the 24-month period starting January 1987 and ending December 1988 are then computed. 
 
These stocks are then ranked based on their CARs and portfolios are formed. Firms in the top 
20% are assigned to the winner portfolio (W) and in the bottom 20% to the loser portfolio (L). 
Arbitrage portfolio is formed by buying loser and selling winner portfolio. The winner, loser and 
arbitrage portfolios are then held for the next 24 months. In the subsequent test period, January 1989 to 
December 1990, the CARs of all stocks in the winner and loser portfolios are recomputed. For every 
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test period at the interval of 1 and 24, the CARs for all stocks in the winner and loser portfolios are 
calculated as follows. 
 
where z is the test period (1, 2, ... 9), N is the number of stocks assigned in each portfolio for each 
formation period and  is the cumulative abnormal returns in month t of the test period z for 
portfolio p. The study then repeats the above method for all nine-formation periods and their 
subsequent test periods. One sample t-test and independent sample t-test of mean difference of the two 
portfolios (portfolio winner and portfolio loser) were then applied to identify the difference in 
abnormal returns of these portfolios during the test period. 
One sample t-test is used to examine whether the loser portfolio and the winner portfolio 
reverse their fortune in the subsequent test period. To achieve this goal, the average CAR across all test 
periods (z) for each of the portfolio in each month between t = 1 and t = 24 are calculated 
 
where p could be a winner (W) or loser (L). ACAR is tested to see if they are significantly different 
from zero. The first part of the analysis investigates whether stocks with poor (good) price performance 
over a two-year period, become relatively better (worse) performers over the following two-year 
period. Then, the study compare the test period abnormal returns between winner and loser portfolios 
to see if there any potential for exploiting these patterns through arbitrage of loser minus winner (i.e. 
contrarian strategy). The overreaction predicts that for t > 0, ACARW,t < 0 and ACARL,t > 0. 
Alternatively, the null hypothesis can be written as: 
H0: [ACARL,t – ACARW,t ] > 0. 
In order to examine the statistical significance of the difference between the loser and the 
winner portfolios, the study needs a pooled estimate of the population variance in CARs. As in De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), the actual estimate is calculated as follows: 
 
Where z is the number of the test period, which is 9. The t-statistic is therefore: 
 
Negative significant t-values for the winner portfolio would suggest that there is evidence of 
stock overreaction existed in the sample, in which it implies that the winner portfolio has reversed and 
perform significantly badly during the test period. The reverse is true for the loser portfolio. Positive 
significant t-values for the loser portfolio support the overreaction hypothesis by suggesting that the 
loser portfolio has performed significantly better in the test period. Meanwhile, positive significant t-
value for the arbitrage portfolio indicates that contrarian strategy of buying loser and selling winner 
portfolios would produce significant abnormal returns in the subsequent period as suggested by the 
overreaction hypothesis. 
 
 
3.  Methodology: Stock Price Bubbles 
This study performs test for duration dependence on abnormal continuously compounded real monthly 
returns of KLCI. The monthly closing indexes, corresponding dividend yield and consumer price index 
are collected from the Datastream. Due to availability of data (dividend yield is only available in 1989 
onwards); this study covers the period between January 1989 and December 2006. 
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The study calculates continuously compounded nominal returns of KLCI using the following 
formula: 
 (1) 
Where  are the continuously compounded nominal returns in month t; and  are price 
index in month t and t-1 respectively. The study then calculates continuously compounded inflation 
rate as: 
 (2) 
Where  is the inflation rate in month t; and  are the consumer price index in 
month t of the current year and consumer price index in month t of the previous year. Next, real returns 
are computed by subtracting continuously compounded inflation from continuously compounded 
nominal returns such as: 
 (3) 
Where  is the real return in month t. The sequence of abnormal returns is defined as the 
residuals from the regression of real returns on its first three lags and the dividend yield. This 
procedure is consistent to those of McQueen and Thorley (1994), Chan et.al (1998) and Jirasakuldech 
et. al (2006, 2007). 
In order to perform the duration dependence test, returns must first be transformed into series of 
run lengths on positive and negative observed abnormal returns. For example, a return series of four 
positive abnormal returns followed by three negatives, two positives and finally four negatives 
abnormal returns is transformed into two data sets, namely, a set for runs of positive abnormal returns 
with values 4 and 2, and a set for runs of negative abnormal returns with values 3 and 4. 
Formally, the data consists of a set ST of T observations on the random run length, I. A run is 
defined as a sequence of abnormal returns of the same signs. Thus, I is a positive valued discrete 
random variable generated by some discrete density function, fi, ≡ Prob (I = i), and corresponding 
cumulative density function, Fi ≡ Prob ( I < i ). Test of duration dependence are implemented by 
examining the hazard rate  for runs of positive and negative returns. According to McQueen and 
Thorley (1994), the hazard rate is defined as a probability of obtaining a negative innovation given a 
sequence of i prior positive innovations,  = Prob( <0 | >0, >0, ..., ..., <0). If bubble 
exists, we expect hazard rate to be decreasing in i, and if bubble exist in runs of positive returns, 
 for all i. Since rational expectation bubbles cannot be negative, for run of negative returns, 
this condition does not hold. In general, speculative bubbles are likely to exist if there is a negative 
relationship between the probability of a run of positive returns ending, and the length of the run, or in 
other words, the presence of bubbles suggest negative duration dependence and a decreasing hazard 
rate in positive abnormal returns, but not in negative abnormal returns. 
To operate test of duration dependence, a functional form must be chosen from the hazard 
function. The study uses the Log Logistic and Weibull Hazard Model as a hazard function. 
 
3.1. Log logistic Hazard Model 
The log logistic hazard model is defined as: 
 (4) 
where α is the shape parameter of the lognormal distribution, β is the duration elasticity of the hazard 
function, Ji is a duration of the process or time to exit from a state, i is the discrete function for 
duration, and Gi is the corresponding distribution function. The discrete density and distribution 
functions for duration are related as: 
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 (5) 
However, if the law of conditional probability is applied, the density for completed duration 
is:  (6) 
In addition, McQueen and Thorley (1994) used the logistic distribution function Ψ evaluated at 
a linear transformation of log duration as: 
-1 (7) 
Define Ni as the count of completed runs of length i in the sample. The density function of the 
log likelihood is: 
 (8) 
where θ is a vector parameters. The hazard function hi ≡ Prob ( I = i │ I > i ), represents the 
probability that a run ends at i, given that it lasts at least until i. A hazard function specification 
describes data in terms of conditional probabilities in contrast to the density function specification, 
which focuses on unconditional probabilities. With regard to this study, the hazard is appropriate since 
it questions whether the probability that run continues depends on the length of the run. The hazard 
function is related to the density function by: 
 (9) 
The hazard function version of the log likelihood is: 
 (10) 
where Mi and Qi is the count of completed and partial runs with a length greater than i, respectively. To 
test the null hypothesis of no rational bubbles, a functional form of the hazard function is first defined 
as: 
 (11) 
The duration dependence test is performed by substituting equation (11) into (10) and 
maximizing the log likelihood function with respect to  and β. The null hypothesis of no rational 
bubbles implies that the probability of a positive run’s ending is unrelated to prior runs, or the hazard 
rate should be constant (H0: β=0). The alternative hypothesis of a bubbles suggests that the probability 
of a positive run’s ending should decrease with the length of the run, or a decreasing hazard rate (H1: 
β<0). According to McQueen and Thorley (1994), an estimate of β that is negative and significantly 
different from zero for positive runs, in conjunction with an insignificant estimate of β for negative 
runs, is considered evidenced of speculative bubbles. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) is asymptotically 
distributed χ2 with one degree of freedom. 
 
3.2. Weibull Hazard Model 
The Weibull hazard model is defined as: 
 
Where  is the probability of survival in a state to at least time (t). The corresponding hazard 
function is: 
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where α is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution, and β is the duration elasticity of the hazard 
function. The fundamental assumption of the Weibull hazard model is a linear relationship between the 
log of the hazard function and the log of duration where: 
 
The Weibull hazard function will exhibit positive (negative) duration dependence if β is 
positive (negative). In the absence of rational bubbles, factor stock prices should demonstrate a random 
walk with no evidence of duration dependence. Negative duration dependence in positive runs would 
suggest the presence of rational speculative bubbles. 
 
 
4.  Findings 
4.1. Stock Overreaction 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of one-sample test for stock overreaction behaviour before and 
after 1997 Asian Financial Crisis respectively. Table 1 shows that arbitrage portfolio of selling winner 
and buying loser earns significant abnormal returns from month 3 through month 7 of the test period. 
The results suggest that Malaysian Stock Market overreacts prior to 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. This 
result is in agreement to those reported by Ahmad and Hussain (2001) and Lai et al (2003). Ahmad and 
Hussain (2001) find evidence of stock overreaction behaviour in the Malaysian Stock Market for the 
period of 1986-1996. The same findings are also reported by Lai et al (2003) for the same market over 
the period between January 1987 and December 1999. 
 
Table 1: Long run stock overreaction Pre-1997 Asian Financial 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Month Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 1.67 0.925 -2.06 -0.781 3.74 1.092 
2 5.90 2.365 * 0.21 0.062 5.69 1.344 
3 6.56 2.311* -0.85 -0.212 7.41 1.770* 
4 6.92 1.404 1.49 0.444 5.43 1.976* 
5 8.03 1.026 -0.09 -0.15 8.12 1.836* 
6 5.78 1.193 -0.64 -0.107 6.41 1.710* 
7 9.35 1.528 0.81 0.141 8.54 3.087** 
8 10.72 1.389 5.83 0.771 4.90 0.571 
9 12.68 1.263 3.39 0.465 9.29 1.084 
10 11.38 0.912 4.73 0.536 6.65 0.525 
11 9.37 0.608 5.79 0.557 3.58 0.191 
12 5.90 0.282 3.02 0.311 2.89 0.120 
13 5.38 0.256 -0.44 -0.065 5.82 0.288 
14 13.02 0.612 -3.14 -0.409 16.15 1.089 
15 9.56 0.451 -5.75 -0.634 15.20 1.194 
16 7.11 0.310 -1.29 -0.618 8.40 0.487 
17 4.63 0.215 -4.88 -0.569 9.51 0.639 
18 4.49 0.217 -4.79 -0.571 9.28 0.592 
19 5.78 0.266 -9.41 -0.838 15.20 1.354 
20 8.38 0.399 -0.70 -0.075 9.07 0.530 
21 14.19 0.671 3.36 0.353 10.83 0.598 
22 11.47 0.600 -0.58 -0.076 12.05 0.810 
23 15.98 0.995 -2.54 -0.339 18.52 1.868* 
24 10.56 0.578 -6.12 -0.774 16.70 1.325 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively. Statistical significant is reduced due to smaller size. 
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After 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, evidence of stock overreaction behaviour as described in 
Table 1 seems to diminish. As shown in Table 2, loser portfolio exhibits continuation behaviour 
whereas winner portfolio displays reversal behaviour. Furthermore, arbitrage strategy does not provide 
any potential abnormal returns as reported by column three of Table 2. The absent of the reversal 
behaviour after the crisis could be due to the reason that investors are more aware of the overreaction 
phenomenon and have altered their trading strategy. Another explanation may be the possible reduction 
of noise trader during the crisis period. De Long et. al (1990) argue that in the presence of noise trader, 
rational speculation can be destabilizing. 
 
Table 2: Long run stock overreaction Post 1997 Asian Financial 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Month Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 0.33 0.319 -2.85 -1.430 3.18 1.065 
2 -2.44 -3.429* -5.32 -1.957* 2.88 0.862 
3 -9.48 -2.180* -8.82 -2.027* -0.67 -1.793 
4 -15.04 -1.806 -6.68 -4.226** -8.36 -1.212 
5 -25.36 -1.844 -7.24 -1.715 -18.12 -1.301 
6 -22.17 -1.466 -6.91 -1.400 -15.25 -1.112 
7 -18.89 -1.198 -6.48 -8.850 -12.41 -1.007 
8 -18.09 -1.217 -7.85 -0.913 -10.25 -0.946 
9 -18.16 -1.236 -10.89 -1.101 -7.27 -0.883 
10 -19.66 -1.294 -10.36 -0.970 -9.30 -0.908 
11 -21.87 -1.318 -10.79 -0.920 -11.07 -0.905 
12 -26.24 -1.457 -15.45 -1.453 -10.80 -0.720 
13 -27.76 -1.445 -13.74 1.552 -14.01 -0.748 
14 -25.53 -1.419 -14.32 -1.644 -11.22 -0.648 
15 -21.26 -1.477 -14.27 -2.040* -6.98 -0.508 
16 -14.48 -1.143 -11.68 -1.832 -2.80 -0.249 
17 -15.88 -1.329 -14.19 -2.104* -1.70 -0.151 
18 -18.12 -1.550 -15.47 -2.703* -2.65 -0.208 
19 -20.33 -1.706 -16.37 -2.860* -3.96 -0.300 
20 -26.94 -2.020 -19.49 -3.289* -7.45 -0.695 
21 -33.78 -1.947 -20.13 -3.225* -13.65 -0.636 
22 -41.51 -1.764 -21.59 -3.949* -19.23 -0.705 
23 -51.33 -1.645 -21.33 -3.514* -30.00 -0.818 
24 -64.69 -1.499 -22.51 -4.615** -42.18 -0.887 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively. Statistical significant is reduced due to smaller size. 
 
4.2. Duration dependence test 
4.2.1. Log logistic hazard model 
The log logistic test results for the full sample period and the two sub-periods namely pre- 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and post 1997 Asian Financial Crisis are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 
For the full sample period, this study documents a total of 106 runs comprising of 53 runs for positive 
and 53 runs for negative abnormal returns. Meanwhile, for the pre crisis period, there are 29 runs of 
positive abnormal returns and 29 runs of negative abnormal returns which make-up a total of 58 runs. 
During the post Asian Financial Crisis, the study reports a total of 48 runs with 24 runs of positive and 
negative abnormal returns. The longest positive runs last 8 months and occurring in the post 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. Relative to the positive runs of abnormal returns, the negative runs tend to have 
shorter lives with the longest run lasting only 6 months. 
Note that one characteristic of a rational speculative bubbles is that the hazard rate should be a 
declining function of the length of positive runs or else, a bubble cannot be sustained. Tables 3, 4 and 5 
also report the sample hazard rates,  which estimate the probability that a run ends at i 
given that it lasts until i. Under the null hypothesis, the hazard rates should be constant or β = 0. 
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Table 3: Test of duration dependence for the full sample period. 
 
Positive runs Negative runs Run length Actual run counts Sample Hazard Rate Actual run counts Sample Hazard Rate 
1 29 0.5472 25 0.4717 
2 12 0.5000 16 0.5714 
3 3 0.2500 7 0.5833 
4 5 0.5556 1 0.2000 
5 1 0.2500 1 0.2500 
6 1 0.3333 3 1.0000 
7 1 0.5000 0 0.0000 
8 1 1.0000 0 0.0000 
TOTAL 53  53  
α  -0.506  -0.420 
β  0.112  0.029 
LRT of H0: β = 0  2.51*  0.13 
(p-value)  (0.1129)  (0.7227) 
Note: * indicates significant at 10% significant level 
 
For the full sample period, the actual hazard rates tend to decrease with run length for positive 
abnormal returns in the first 2 months. Table 3 shows that there is a 54.72% probability that positive 
abnormal returns lasting for 1 month will reverts to a negative abnormal returns in the next month, 
whereas there are 50% and 25% probability that positive abnormal returns lasting for 2 months and 3 
months will reverse in the subsequent period respectively. This declining pattern suggests the presence 
of rational speculative bubbles in the associated security prices. However for runs of negative abnormal 
returns, there is no obvious pattern of increasing or decreasing in hazard rates that is consistent with 
rational speculative bubbles. 
In addition to that, Table 3 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the log logistic 
function parameters α and β for full sample period as well as the pre- and post Asian Financial Crisis 
sub-periods. As shown in Table 3, positive runs of abnormal returns exhibit positive β coefficient (β = 
0.112). Positive β coefficient for the positive runs suggests positive duration dependence which is not 
consistent with the rational bubbles. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) of the null hypothesis of no 
duration dependence or constant hazard rate is rejected at the 10% significant level with the LRT of 
2.51. This result is consistent to those reported earlier by Chan et. al (1998) that Malaysia stock 
markets is not subject to rational speculative bubbles. Also notes that rational speculative bubbles 
cannot occur in runs of negative abnormal returns. As a result, this study does not find any evidence of 
rational bubbles in the negative abnormal returns for the full sample period of January 1989 to 
December 2006. This study fails to reject the null hypothesis of constant hazard rate or the no bubble 
hypothesis of β = 0 at traditional significant levels for the full sample period. 
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Table 4: Test of duration dependence for the pre 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
 
Positive runs Negative runs Run length Actual run counts Sample Hazard Rate Actual run counts Sample Hazard Rate 
1 20 0.6897 11 0.3793 
2 7 0.7778 10 0.5556 
3 1 0.5000 4 0.5000 
4 1 1.0000 1 0.2500 
5 0 0.0000 1 0.3333 
6 0 0.0000 2 1.0000 
TOTAL 29  29  
α  -0.548  -0.406 
β  0.616  -0.089 
LRT of H0: β = 
0  9.19***  0.52 
(p-value)  (0.0024)  (0.4722) 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% significant level 
 
Meanwhile, the results of pre-1997 Asian Financial Crisis convey similar information to those 
of the full sample period. Table 4 shows that the study fails to reject the null hypothesis of no bubbles 
during the pre-crisis era. The β coefficient during the sub-period is positive (β = 0.616) and the LRT of 
9.19 is significant at 1% level. For the negative runs, the study reports similar results to those of full 
sample period. The null hypothesis of no bubbles cannot be rejected at traditional significant level 
during the pre-Asian Financial Crisis. Unlike the hazard rate of the entire period, the hazard rate of pre-
crisis sub-period shows no distinguishable increasing or decreasing pattern for positive run of 
abnormal returns. This pattern is therefore not consistent with rational speculative bubbles. A similar 
finding is also observed for the runs of negative abnormal returns. 
The significantly positive β found in positive runs of abnormal returns for the full sample 
period and the pre-crisis sub-period indicate that as the length of the sequence of positive abnormal 
returns increases, the probability that the positive runs will end increases. This pattern is not consistent 
with rational speculative bubbles; instead, it is in line with the mean reversion process. According to 
Jirasakuldech et. al (2006), these findings suggest that a mean reversion process tend to characterize 
the return distribution during those period and sub-period. 
Table 5 presents results of log logistic hazard model for the post 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Results of sample hazard rates for post crisis sub-period demonstrates declining pattern that is 
consistent with evidence of rational speculative bubbles. Table 5 shows that the probability that 
positive abnormal returns lasting for 1, 2, and 3 months before it’s revert to negative abnormal returns 
in the next period are 37.5%, 33.3% and 20% respectively. In other word, for the 15 runs that last at 
least 2 months, 2 runs or 20% end in month 3. Meanwhile, the hazard rates for negative runs are 
relatively constant thus consistent with rational speculative bubbles. Table 5 also reports maximum 
likelihood estimates of the log logistic function parameters for the post crisis era. The study reports a 
negative β coefficient of β = -0.094. The result however is not significant. The negative β found in 
positive abnormal returns sequence implies that the probability that the positive runs will end decreases 
as the length of the run increases, which is consistent with rational speculative bubbles. Furthermore, 
the negative runs of abnormal returns fail to reject the null hypothesis of no bubble at traditional level. 
As suggested by McQueen and Thorley (1994), an estimate of significantly negative β for positive 
runs, in conjunction with an insignificant estimate of β for negative runs is evidence of speculative 
bubbles. 
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Table 5: Test of duration dependence for the post 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
Positive runs Negative runs Run length Actual run counts Sample Hazard Rate Actual run counts Sample Hazard Rate 
1 9 0.3750 14 0.5833 
2 5 0.3333 6 0.6000 
3 2 0.2000 3 0.7500 
4 4 0.5000 0 0.0000 
5 1 0.2500 0 0.0000 
6 1 0.3333 1 1.0000 
7 1 0.5000 0 0.0000 
8 1 1.0000 0 0.0000 
TOTAL 24  24  
α  0.131  -0.140 
β  -0.027  0.018 
LRT of H0: β = 0  1.79  0.45 
(p-value)  (0.1812)  (0.5035) 
Note: * indicates significant at 10% significant level 
 
4.2.2. Weibull hazard model 
Besides log logistic hazard model, this study also employs the Weibull hazard model as a hazard 
function for duration dependence test. Results of Weibull model are presented in Table 6 for positive 
and negative runs for full sample period as well as pre- and post 1997 Asian financial Crisis sub-
periods. These findings are consistent with those of log logistic hazard model. For the full sample 
period, the study shows that the β coefficient or the estimated duration elasticity is positive, but it is not 
significantly different from zero (LRT = 1.27, β = 0.074) at traditional level for both positive and 
negative runs. However, for the pre-crisis sub-period, the estimated duration elasticity, β is positive and 
significantly different from zero at 1% level for the positive runs. 
For the negative runs, the β coefficient is negative (β = -0.149) and significant at 10% level. 
According to Chan et. al (1998, page 136), rational speculative bubbles cannot be negative, thus, the 
evidence of negative duration dependence in the negative runs of abnormal returns during the pre-crisis 
sub-period “must be driven by chance or some other deviation from other independent returns such as 
fads, but not by rational bubbles”. Meanwhile, for the post crisis sub-period, results of Weibull hazard 
model also convey similar information to those of log logistic hazard model. The β coefficient or 
duration elasticity is found to be negative (β = -0.026) and significant at 10% level for the positive 
runs. For negative runs, the results is not significant thus consistent with rational speculative bubbles. 
 
Table 6: Results of Weibull hazard model 
 
Positive runs Negative runs  
α β LRT (p-value) α β LRT (p-value) 
Full sample 0.705 0.074 1.27 (0.2590) 0.719 0.020 0.11 (0.7380) 
Pre-crisis 0.672 0.598 10.88*** (0.0010) 0.748 -0.149 2.22* (0.1365) 
Post crisis 0.159 -0.026 2.73* (0.0983) 0.167 0.031 1.70 (0.1922) 
Note: * and *** indicates significant at 10% and 1% significant level 
 
Both results of log logistic hazard model and Weibull hazard model demonstrates that rational 
speculative bubble does not exist before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis sub-period. However, after the 
crisis sub-period, the β coefficient is found to be significantly negative, thus, suggest the presence of 
rational speculative bubbles during the post crisis sub-period. Notes that β coefficient is initially 
positive in the pre-crisis sub-period and become negative in the post crisis era as abnormal returns 
increases. This implies that the hazard rates are getting smaller and thus, giving more time for the 
market to further pushes the abnormal returns during the recovery period which later resulted in 
rational bubbles. 
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4.3. Potential linkage between stock overreaction and stock price bubbles 
As mentioned earlier, a number of studies such as Komáromi (2003), Dreman and Lufkin (2000), 
Bremer et. al (1997) and Ohanian (1996) conjecture that stock overreaction is a major cause of stock 
price bubbles, thus suggest a potential linkage between stock overreaction and stock price bubbles. 
Table 7 summarizes results of long-run overreaction and stock price bubbles analysed earlier. 
 
Table 7: Summary results of stock overreaction and rational bubbles 
 
Stock Overreaction Rational Bubbles  2-year period Log Logistic Hazard model Weibull Hazard model 
Full Sample No evidence of overreaction No evidence of price bubbles. Positive β coefficient 
Pre-Crisis Significant evidence of overreaction No evidence of price bubbles. Positive β coefficient 
Post Crisis No evidence of overreaction Significant evidence of price bubbles. Negative β coefficient 
 
Jirasakuldech et. al (2006) assert that evidence of rational speculative bubbles represented by 
significant positive β in positive runs of abnormal returns for full sample period and pre-crisis sub-
period suggest that a mean reversion process tend to characterize the return distribution during those 
periods. Positive β in the positive runs of abnormal returns implies that as the length of the positive run 
increase, the probability that the run ends is also increases, thus warn price reversal behaviour in the 
subsequent period, which is coherent with the mean reversion process. 
This finding therefore supports the earlier conclusion of stock overreaction behaviour where 
Malaysian stock market is found to overreact during the pre-crisis. As stated by Chen and Sauer (1997) 
and Brailsford (1992), stock overreaction is in agreement with the mean reversion process, where 
reversal behaviour is expected to take place in the next period. Therefore, as anticipated by this study, 
during the period where stock overreaction is present, there is very unlikely that stock price bubbles to 
emerge. This is because, for price bubbles to sustain, the positive run of abnormal return should exhibit 
continuation behaviour instead of reversal behaviour. 
After the crisis sub-period, this study documents evidence suggesting the existence of rational 
speculative bubbles in the market. During the same period, this study shows no evidence of stock 
overreaction behaviour existed in the market. This finding indicates that during the post crisis sub-
period, Malaysian stock market does not follow the mean reversion process. This is supported by 
negative β documented by the study during the period, which indicates that the probability that positive 
runs end as the length of the positive runs increase is declining. In light of past studies mentioned 
above, stock overreaction behaviour observed in the pre-crisis period may become one of the factors 
that cause the existence rational speculative bubbles in Malaysian stock market during the post crisis. 
A possible reason is, stocks that have overreact may not returns to its mean in the subsequent period. 
They may have reversed, but they do not come back to their mean before they overreact again. If this 
scenario prolongs and if the deviation is ‘wide’ enough, financial bubbles may be created in the 
subsequent period. 
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
This study attempts to seek linkage between stock overreaction behaviour and financial bubbles in the 
Malaysian stock market. The study uses the basic framework of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) to test for 
stock overreaction. Duration dependence test is used to investigate evidence of bubbles. Monthly data 
over a period between January 1987 and December 2006 shows no clear evidence of stock overreaction 
behaviour in the market. However, when the study split the analysis into two sub-periods namely pre-
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and post 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, evidence of stock overreaction 
behaviour becomes significant in the pre-crisis sub-period. During the post crisis sub-period, evidence 
of overreaction hypothesis seems to diminish. Results of the Duration dependence show no significant 
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evidence that support the presence of rational speculative in Malaysian stock market in the pre-1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. The significantly positive beta coefficient documented by the study is 
consistent with the mean reversion process, which indicates that the probability the positive abnormal 
returns will end is increasing with the length of the run, which is contradictory to the rational bubbles 
theory but consistent with the stock overreaction behaviour. During the post crisis, evidence of stock 
overreaction documented in the previous period seems to diminish, and evidence of bubbles becomes 
significant. Komáromi (2003), Dreman and Lufkin (2000), Bremer et. al (1997) and Ohanian (1996) 
suggest that stock overreaction is evidence of bubbles, or put it in another word, stock overreaction 
effect is the cause of financial bubbles. In light of that, this study believes that evidence of bubbles 
observed in the Malaysian stock market in the post crisis period is due to stock overreaction that took 
place in the market prior to the crisis. However, further study need to be done to explore the properties 
of stock overreaction in the pre-crisis period to determine whether it is the cause of financial bubbles. 
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